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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JlOHl\1~

L. PETERS,

Plaiutiff and Appellant
Case No. 10059

-vs.-

YII\( il XL\ PETERS,
Defewl a11t-Rcspondent

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
~T.\TE~lENT

OF NATURE OF CASE

Thi~

is an appeal from a decision of the District
Court of the Second District before Hon. Parley E. Nor~dh, in which Plaintiff's complaint for divorce was dismissed and Defendant granted a decree of divorce on her
eountPrelaim. Defendant was awarded $2500.00 in lieu
of alimony, together with $350.00 counsel fees for the use
and benefit of her attorney.

DISPOSITIOX IX LOvVER COURT
Plaintiff and appellant herein filed an action for
divorce on the ~Sth day of October 1963 (R-2) together
1
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with an order to show cause, why Defendant should not
remove herself from the home of Plaintiff and Defendant
together with a restraining order enjoining and restraining Defendant from returning to her home and from harassing or annoying Plaintiff or the adopted daughter
of both Plaintiff and Defendant (R.. 3) and a citation
directed to Defendant (R. 12). Defendant, thereafter filed
an answer and counterclaim (It-4) and a motion to vacate the restraining order and order to show cause and
for an order for temporary alimony and attorney fees
(R-6). Because of the manifest unfairness of the restraining order having been issued enjoining Defendant
from returning home after she had left in the morning
and was served at her work, without her having an opportunity to be heard before the issuance of such an order,
the Defendant filed an affidavit of prejudice.
The matter was on November 4, 1963 transferred to
Judge N orseth's division. He immediately vacated the
restraining order and ordered Defendant to occupy the
home with Plaintiff, and ordered Plaintiff to pay Defendant $50.00 as temporary alimony and set the time for
trial for November 13, 1964 at 1 P.M. (R. 10) Defendant
thereupon, with leave of Court filed an amended counterclaim (R. 11).
On November 18, 1963 a trial was had and the matter
submitted and the 'Court instructed counsel to submit
written briefs (R. 14). Although Defendant submitted
her brief within the required ten day period (R. 17)
Plaintiff at no time filed a brief.
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On l>t·<'PllllH•r lS, 1963, Judge Norseth rendered his
mt-mornmlum dPeision (R. :20) and thereafter, in accordlUH't' with tlw memo rand tun, on the 3rd day of January
19ti-l, finding-::-; of fact and conclusions of law (R. 21) and
a dt•ert·(' of divoreP (R. 22) were made and entered and
a nwmorandmn of costs filed (R. 15). By its provisions
Plaintit't''s complaint wa~ dis1nissed and Defendant
awarded a dPen•e of divorce on her counterclaim. The
real property standing in the joint names of the parties
wa::-; awarded to Plaintiff; the personal property which
Paeh ot' the partiP~ had at the time of the marriage was
nwarded to Paeh of them respectively. The Defendant
was awarded a smn of $2500.00 in lieu of alimony to~l'tlwr with $350.00 as counsel fees for the use and
bt'net'it of Plaintiff's attorney.
On January 7th, 1964, Messrs. Clayton & Gould were
:-;uh:-;titukd as counsel for Plaintiff in place of Messrs.
Hit·hanb, Alsup & Richards. (R. 23)
Dt'fendant thereupon caused to be issued a writ of
PXt'eution and garnishment (R. 2±, 25, 26) and on the
1-lth day of January, 1964, plaintiff filed notice of appeal
~R. :27 ).
On February 5, 196-±, and before the transcript and
record had gone to the Supreme Court, Defendant filed
a petition for te1nporary alimony, pending the disposition of the action in the higher Court, and for an attorDl'y·~ t\•e in accordance with Sec. 30-3-3, Utah Code
.Annotah·d. for the preparation and presentation of Defl'lhlant'~ defense in the Supreme Court.

3
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and appellant herein seeks to reverse the
ruling of the trial 'Court and grant hiln a divorce and
particularly to relieve him from having to pay out any
money, either in lieu of alimony or as attorney's fees
and to turn Defendant out of the marriage empty handed.
Appellant further appeals from the trial court's order
awarding temporary alimony and attorney's fees for
respondent's counsel in the Supreme Court.
S:TATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married on the 6th day of November, 1961, at Preston, Idaho. Both parties had been
married before. Appellant had living in his home a young
woman named J acklyn Peters, but appellant and his
former wife had not adopted the girl. (Tr. 6)
Prior to the marriage appellant persuaded respondent to sign an antinuptial agreement which was introduced in evidence . (R. 16)
About 15 months after the marriage the parties had
trouble and Plaintiff and appellant brought an action
for divorce against Defendant and Respondent and on
February 13, 1964 a decree was entered in favor of
Plaintiff and against Defendant (Tr. 8). By its terms
nothing was awarded to Defendant by a default. Later,
on the 14th day of May, 1963, this Decree of Divorce was
set aside ('Tr. 35).
Evidence was introduced of a deed to the home
which the parties occupied dated March 9, 1962 (Tr. 36).
4
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~\ ppt~llant

u.nd HPspondent took title to the property as
joint tPnants. On April :2:2nd, 1963 and prior to the settin~ u~idt· of tlw Deere(• of Divorce, :Mrs. Peters, Re~poJldt·nt, eonvt•ypd to appellant by warranty de€d, her
intc·n·:-;t in thl' property (R.16) (Tr. 80).
On .\pril :2~). 1963 a Decree of Adoption was made
and t•nkn•d in whieh Appellant and Respondent adopted
,Jlwklyn . . \11 of appellant's stocks and bonds which the
partil':-; held a~ joint tenants, were transferred to appellant alone (Tr. C>-t-Tr. 80). Now with all of his property
n•(•oupt·d, the appellant had the decree of divorce set
nsidl' and the marital relationship was resumed.
Thel"t•aftPr the marriage continued and shortly before
tlll' filing of the present action, Appellant transferred
$:!.:-)llll.OO front his own bank account and placed it in the
name of .J acklyn ( Tr. 53). Shortly after this Appellant
then commenced the present divorce action.
All the way through the trial Appellant exhibited
a great concern for his money and property and a fear
that Ht·~lHHldl•nt, as his wife, 1night share in some of it
(Tr. -!0--H, 3G-3 7). Appellant contends that Respondent
aid not treat this young lady who was eighteen years
of age properly and that she quarreled with him over
money ( Tr. 37).
Respondent, on the other hand, in support of her
counterclaim, contends that ~\ppellant treated her cruelly and ~truck her on a nlunber of occasions (Tr. 87). She
tt·~tified that she had gotten along with J acklyn and
purchased gifts for her (Tr. 81), (the young lady Jacklyn
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(Tr. 71)) and made clothes for her. Appellants testified
that she had worked during the entire 1narriage, and took
home about $250.00 per month; that out of this money
she had paid her own doctor bills and bought groceries
(Tr. 88) and used all of her money in the home (Tr. 9±)
(Tr. 40).
Based upon this evidence the Court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, granted Defendant a divorce on her
counterclaim and awarded her $2500.00 in lieu of alimony, together with $350.00 as counsel fees.
The real property, together with all his stocks, bonds,
bank accounts automobile and motor boat was awarded
to Appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE REOORD SUSTAINS THE DISTRICT COURT IN
AWARDING RESPONDENT A LUMP SUM IN LIEU OF
ALIMONY.

Throughout the trial it appears that Appellant was
very much concerned about parting with any of his worldly goods or permitting Respondent to participate in any
kind of security that he might be able to give her. This
attitude apparently was with him even prior to the marriage, when he took Respondent to his attorney and there
she, without advice of counsel, entered into the antinuptial agreement (R. 16).
Appellant here complains that the Court erred in
awarding a lump sum in lieu of alimony. In the case
of Foreman v. Foreman, 111 Utah 72, (176 P. 2nd 144)
at page 87, the Court said:

6
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"The marriage In the case at bar lasted approximately 68 days, both parties are in their
Ntrly middle ages, each is cOining out of the exl>Pl'il'IH'l' approxi1nately as he or she went into it
as far a~ health and job expectations are concernt-o. Both parties had substantial property to begin with and Pxeept for the $1800.00 awarded Mrs.
J<,oreman approximately $1400.00 of which came
from tlw property .Mr. Foreman had prior to his
marriagt>, they are separated with their treasures
$425.00 gross and $365.57 net. ~Irs. Foreman's
$25.00. The Court found that the conduct of the
DefPndant, respondent, has caused the Plaintiff
great mental and physical distress and illness, and
that her conduct has not caused him any distress.
The parties litigated fully the question of fault in
thl' east' at bar-a material distinction between
tlw case at bar and Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255.
G7 P. ~d 265.
And we state in Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah at
page ~tiO, 67 P. 2nd page 267 :
'In cases where her health has suffered
or his conduct has been such as to justify,
alimony for a period may be granted.'
Under the reasoning of the above cited case
if alilnony for a period is proper a lump sum
award could be properly made... "
The matter of a hunp smn payment in lieu of alimony is a discretionary n1atter with the trial Court.
In :27 .\. C.J.S. 1079 it is stated as follows:
"It has been held to be proper and the better
practirP, at least with respect to some situations
to award alimony in gross, as where the divorce
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is an absolute one, restoring the parties to t1Jl'
state of unmarried persons, where the marriage
was of particularly short duration, where there
being no children, the lives of the parties will
diverge, where the ·wife has brought money or
property to the husband, or where property has
been accumulated by the joint efforts of the husband and wife. It must be clear that the husband
has assets sufficient to pay the gross award.
"In the final analysis, the question of whether
or not an allowance of a gross sum should be made
must be determined by the facts of the particular
case, having due regard to the best interest of
the parties and the husband's financial ability to
respond to an award in gross ; and in general,
where the award may be by alimony in gross
or by periodic alimony the award will depend
on the sound discretion of the court under the
particular circumstances. Accordingly, where
alimony in gross is awarded, it is especially jmportant that every fact material to the determination of a just award should be before the
Court."
In the instant case the Court took into consideration
all of the circumstances including Appellant's ability to
pay and the fact that he had acquired a considerable
amount of property, although he had 1nost of it when
he married Respondent. (Tr. R. 16) The fact that Respondent worked and contributed her small amount to the
welfare of the family was also considered by the Court.
In Sorenson. v. Sorenson, 14 U. 2nd :2-1, 376 P. 2nd
547, Mr. Justice Wade said in the opinion:
"Unless there is a manifest injustice and inequity or a clear abuse of discretion, this Court
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will not substitute its judg1nent for that of the
trial Court."
.\vvonling to his brief Appellant not only objects

to tlw award of a lun1p sum in lieu of alimony, but, to
tht~

payment to Respondent of anything at all. Even
though she worked, during nearly all of the marriage
antl turnl'd ht>r money to the payment of household obligation~, and to the paying of her own doctor bills (Tr.
~~) ..\ppellant is unwilling to give her anything for her
efforts in the marriage and would like her turned out
with nothing, he to have and keep all of the benefits of
her labors during the 1narriage. In other words, the obligation to support his wife during the marriage meant
nothing to hhn. Appellants points out that she is in good
health and able to make her own way and therefore the
Court should turn her out with nothing.
Judge Xor~Pth considered all of the facts before him
including the length of the marriage, the condition of
tlw parties and the financial ability of the Appellant
to at least in part con1pensate her for her efforts in the
marriage. (Tr. 101)
"~ P submit that there has been no abuse of discretion by the award to Respondent of a lump sum which

Appellant has been ordered to pay in lieu of alimony.
In the east> of Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 Utah 504,
~~~) P. :!nd tiS, 34 ALR 2nd 305, "Ch. J. Wolfe"
.. The modern view is that the Court should
In doing equity, take into consideration all of
9
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the circumstances and withhold or decree alimoney and distribute the property in accordance with those circumstances."
The Court because of the short duration of the marriage
did not saddle appellant with a permanent Order for payment of alimony. The award as made was commensurate
with the parties standard of living and the Court took
into consideration the contribution which Respondent
had made to the marriage by way of money. She testified
that she had contributed her pay check to the marriage
in addition to serving Appellant as a faithful wife (Tr.
88). The divorce was not of her making, but rather was
Appellant's idea. Now he would like to cast her off like
an old suit of clothes and replace her with a new one at
little or no cost for the exchange. This was all visible
and apparent to Judge Nor seth at the trial, and was all
undoubtedly considered by him in making his decision.
BOINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE
EVIDENCE IN AWARDING RESPONDENT A DIVORCE
FROM APPELLANT.
(A) THE DECISION IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
<B) THERE IS ABUNDANT EVIDENCE OF THE EXTREME MENTAL ANGUISH SUFFERED BY RESPONDENT.

A. The trial Court had both of the parties before it and
had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of each of
them.
This Honorable Court has held that a wife is entitled
to a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty on much

10
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lNiS Pvidt>rwt~

than it will require of the husband who must
::;how a somewhat aggravated case.
In the case of Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 P. 781,
Ch. J. Straup said:
"Each case must depend upon its own facts
and circumstances. The adjudged cases show that
courts, on the ground of cruelty, grant the wife a
decree on 1nuch less evidence than they do the
husband. That rests on sound principles, for acts
and conduct on the part of a husband may well
constitute cruelty to the wife, causing her great
mental distress, when similar acts and conduct
on her part may not constitute cruelty to him,
or cause him great mental distress. Before a decree is granted the husband on such ground, it
ought to be a somewhat aggravated case."
This was followed and quoted in Hyrup v. Hyrup,

66 Ftah 580, 245 P. 335.
Again in Cordner v. Cordner, 91 Utah 466, 61 P.2nd
601, this Court citing the Hyrup case (supra) states it
as follows:
Moffatt J .
.. Two people who cannot adjust themselves
should not by the court be required to maintain a
relationship that has become intolerable to them.
Xo such situation is revealed by the allegations
of the complaint. Some nagging and fault finding by each spouse is to be expected, and the husband being the stronger, ought to take and forbear much of it with patience * * * what may be
cruelty causing great mental distress in one case

11
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may not be in another. Each case must depend
upon its own facts and circumstances. The adjudged cases show that courts, on the ground of
cruelty, grant the wire a decree on 1nuch less evidence than they do the husband. That rests on
sound principles, for acts and conduct on the part
of a husband may well constitute cruelty to
the wife causing her great mental distress,
when similar acts and conduct on her part may
not constitute cruelty to him, or cause him great
mental distress. Before a decree is granted the
husband on such gound, it ought to be a somewhat aggravated case." Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200,
158 P. 781; Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Utah 580, 245 P.
335.
See also Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah 257, 52 P. 2nd
428; Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, 112 Utah 31, 1184 P. 2nd
670.
In the recent case of Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13 Utah
2nd, 153, 360 P. 2nd 923, this Court held, (Callister, Justice):
"(1) What constitutes mental cruelty must
be ascertained from the facts of each case.
Whether Defendant's conduct was cruel and
whether it caused plaintiff to suffer great mental
distress, can only be determined in light of the
sensibility of this particular plaintiff. Persons'
sensibilities may vary due to their different degrees of intelligence, refinement, delicacy of
health, etc. For this reason, the same conduct may
constitute mental cruelty in one case and not in
another. The ultimate answer depends not so
much on defendant's conduct, but rather on the
effect such conduct had upon the plaintiff.
12
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( ~) An additional factor of importance is
wla·ther the granting of the divorce would conflict with the public interest our divorce statutes
wPre designed to protect. The public has an intPrPst in the preservation of marriages in which
t lw parties have mutual love and respect, and
where the circumstances promote the happiness
wPlfan•, health and morality of the parties and of
tlwir children. However, there is no public interP~t in the preservation of a marriage where one
of the parties can no longer endure the relationship without impairing his or her health; or
where the conduct of one party has deteriorated
the relationship to the extent that the parties will
no longer continue cohabitation, and the marriage
exists only in name but not in fact."
In determining these factors the trial judge has
tlw advantage of hearing the testimony and observing
the demeanor of the witnesses and unless there is an
abn~P of discretionary powers, this Court has held it will
not disturb the ruling of the trial Court. Weiss v. Weiss,
111 Utah 353,179 P. 2nd 1005.
In Lmclor v. Lawlor, 121 Utah 201, 240 P.2nd 271,
this Court held (Wade Justice) :
"This court is reluctant to modify a divorce
decree because the evidence is contradictory and
the trial court having seen and heard the witnesses is more able to determine their credibility
than we are. Also, in the absence of an abuse of
discretion, we do not disturb the property division. 'ye have carefully read the transcript and
feel that the court's decision is fairly sustained
by the evidence and that there was no abuse of
discretion."

13
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In considering the testin1ony the Trial Court had to
conclude that from the very beginning of his relationship with respondent appellant never at any time acted
in good faith.
The evidence therefore weighed heavily in favor of
respondent on her counterclaim.
The terms and conditions which appellant imposed
on respondent by his antenuptial agreement, (R. 16) together with the terms and conditions therein contained
and the circumstances under which he persuaded respondent to go to his own lawyer's office and enter into
it (Tr. 30-74) should give any trier of the facts a true
insight into the small, shabby manner in which this
man's mind worked. This Court may observe from examination of the record what a difficulty appellant's counsel had to get him to state anything of any consequence
whatsoever as to what caused him to file this action.
(Tr.14-15-16-17-18-19)

In appelant's brief, In an attempt to discredit respondent, he states that respondent had had "some association with her ex-husband." Transcript 21:
At this time did you dial the phone, or did
you see your wife dial your phone~
A. I did, yes.
Q. Who did she ask for~
A. She asked for her boy.
Q. What is the boy's name~
A. Eddie.

"Q.

14
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phone~

Q.

All right, and then Eddie carne to the

.\.

He did not con1e to the phone. She talked to
her ex-husband.

Q.

And that is what you are complaining about
today ~ Is that it 1
~Lr.

Richards: That isn't proper voir dire.

Mr. Duncan' : All right,

B 1 .Mr. Richards :

Q. Now did this cause a problem between you
and your wife~ The fact she was talking
to her ex-husband~
A.

I told her to knock it off, and I believe she
cut it out. They went back together again,
so-Her ex-husband and his wife went back
together again, and then she never called,
that I know of, anymore."

This is a grabbing of straws when by appellant's
own testimony, she quit talking to her ex-husband when
he complained.
Respondent's concern for her own son and appellant's refusal to consider her desires in regard to the boy
along with his insistence that the 18-year old young
woman, Jacklyn, whom appellant had raised to have
t'n'ry privilege of a natural born daughter, while he
turned respondent's son out. (Trans. 90), caused additional friction and clearly demonstrates appellant's onesided thinking.
"Q.
~\.

X ow one other thing. At the time you were
married, was your son living there~
Yes.

15
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Q.

And why does your son not live there now1

A.

Because we were always arguing, it seemPd
like, and part of it was because he just-well,
he did not want hin1 in the house.

Q.

Did Mr. Peters say anything like that~

A.

Yes. He said that he was not welcome.

Q.

Did you discuss his living there before you
were married~

A.

Yes.

Q.

And what did l\lr. Peters say he could

A.

He said he could live there. In fact he was
planning on building a home, and had even
chosen a bedroom Eddie was supposed to
occupy."

do~

There was considerable testimony about Mrs. Peters
wanting to be alone some times with appellant and the
fact that he wanted J acklyn along all the time.
As to the name calling appellant testifed that respondent called J acklyn a "whore," but respondent denies
this and states the only time this word was used in the
home was when appellant called her one. (Tr. 80)
All through the trial appellant, by his own testimony and his conduct appears penurious, stingy and
totally unable to accept respondent fully as his wife
and permit her to share in the fmnily affairs, especially
in regard to any interest appellant had in any property.
Trans. 40:
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"Q.

\\~ell, yon took thi~ titlt> as joint tenants, isn't
that right!

.\.

rrhat was tlH' way it-I didn't know what I
was doing.

Q.

That wa~ the only thing that bothered you,
that caused the first divorce 1

~\.

That'~

Q.

All right. Now she conveyed all this property
to yon, didn't she 1

A.

Yt·~.

Q.

~o that it's your position now that she doesn't
have any interest in that home 1

A.

That's right.

right.

Q. Not even a dower right, is that right 1
A.

She hasn't put a dollar in it.

Q. By the way, she has worked most of her marriage hasn't she 1
A. Quite a lot of it, yes."
The record bears this out completely. (Trans. 39-40)
B. .:\s to evidence being offered by respondent
showing that appellant's conduct resulted in extreme
mental anguish, there were numerous quarrels, but in
each easp respondent attempted to reconcile them. After
the first divorce she even transferred all interest to him
in his stoeks, bonds and real property which she held
with him as joint tenants, all to make the "marriage
work." ( Tr. ~~) (...:-\.lso see record and file no. 39985 of
t'i rst divorce action between the parties) :
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"Q.

Now I direct your attention to after this first
Decree of Divorce was entered. Thereafter
you got together, didn't you 1

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now did he come to you, or did you come to
him1

A.

He came down to my apartment.

Q.

What did he say 1

A.

Well, we would sit and talk about these
differences that were upsetting him so.

Q.

Give us the substance of the conversation,
as near as you can remember it.

A.

Well, we were talking about reconciling, and
it seemed like the only thing that was really
upsetting him was that the house and the
stocks were still as joint tenants.

Q. What did you say to him 1
A.

I said: 'Well, if that is your problem, if we
reconcile we'll have a will made and then I'll
sign the house and the things back to you. If
this is what will make the marriage work.'

Q.

Is that why you signed 1

A.

Yes.

Q. Did you want to 1nake this marriage work1
A. I certainly did.
Q. And did you exhibit any love or affection
for your husband at that time 1
A. Well, sure."
On the other hand Appellant was cruel with respondent. There was some evidence of condonation from time
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to tillH', but IH'Vl'r, did they lin· together as husband and
wtl't•, uftt•r tlw b(•at ing ht- gave her and in which she
l'allSl'(l tht• police to hl' eallP<L (Tr. 87) The bruises were
t•xhibitt•d in Court at the trial about three weeks later
('rr. -W).
\\" e submit that respondent was not only subjected
to l'onstant mental annoyances from appellant but that
ht• also subjPeted her to physical mistreatment when he

felt the m·l·asion warranted it.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARDS OF ALIMONY AND
.\ TTORNEY'S FEES PENDING APPEAL WAS PROPER AND
I~ ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTE.
::o-:>-:.~,

Utah Code Annotate:

"Temporary alimony and suit money. The
court may order either party to pay the clerk a
sum of nwney for the separate support and
maintenance of the adverse party and the children and to enable such party to prosecute or
defendant the action."

This suit was of the Appellant's own doing. He commenced it twice .
.\fter the Pntry of judg1nent Plaintiff and Appellant
herein st'l'Yt•d Xotice of his Appeal to this Court, but
before the record had been transferred to the Supreme
Cnnrt. the Defendant and Respondent petitioned the District Court for an award of temporary alimony pending
the disposition of the action in the Supreme Court and
for a reasonable smu as counsel fees for the use and bene-
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fit of Respondent's attorney in the preparation and
defense of the action in the Supreme Court. This was
filed February 5, 1964 and the transcript and records
were not received in the Supreme Court until March 18,
1964. The District Court thereafter awarded Defendant,
Respondent herein, $50.00 per month as alimony pending the disposition of the action in the Supreme Court
and $350.00 as counsel fees for the use and benefit of her
attorney in preparing and presenting her defense in the
Supreme iCourt.
The matter of attorney's fees is also a matter of discretion with the Court.
Again in the case of Alldredge v. Aldredge (supra)
this Court held that even though a husband is granted
a Decree of Divorce on the ground of mental cruelty
and a wife's counterclaim is dismissed does not preelude
an allowance to the wife of attorney's fees.
Ch. J. Wolfe':
"The general rule is that a wife is a privileged suitor in divorce cases and if she is without
income competent for her support, and the maintenance of the suit, living separated from her husband, the Court will allow her ali1nony pendente
lite and 1noney to carry on her suit without inquiry into the merits.
"The reason for permitting a wife suit money
to defend an action for divorce rests on the ground
that the wife normally has no separate estate
from which to pay for bringing or defending the
action. This is the situation in the case at hand.
Not to allow the wife expenses and counsel fees
would in the majority of cases work an injustice
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hy dPnying her the power to enforce any marital
right~ which ~hP Inay have. Here, as in the case
of alimony, gross or im1noral conduct may cause
n denial o I' attorney's fpp~, but such conduct is not
found in this case. It was error for the court to
(ll'nV tlw defendant counsel fees which are a part
of her costs pendente lite and which could have
hPPn rt>quired before the suit was concluded."
In JJ"cis8 v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P 2nd 1005,
~lr .• Ju~tieL' \Yolfe writing the opinion stated:

"The statute does not contemplate that
awards for expenses of suit or for temporary alimony should be made only in those cases where
till' "adverse party" (usually the wife) is destitute or practically so. It contemplates such
awards when in the sound discretion of the court
the eircumstances of the parties are such that in
fairness to the wife, she should be given financial
a~~i8tanre by her husband in her prosecution or
(ldPn8e of the divorce action, and for her support
during its pendency."
The language of the Weiss case was requoted in the
l'll~P of Stuber v. Stuber, 121 Utah 632, 244 P. 2nd 650,
adding further :
"The rights of the wife to attorney's fees
when she is forced to go to court to enforce
a divorce decree should not be different from
those of one who seeks temporary alimony. The
court did not err in granting attorney's fees to
n•spondent."
At the time the Order was made Plaintiff and appellant herein had merely filed his notice of appeal and the
fill'S and records were not sent to the Supreme Court
untilJO days later.
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We submit there was nothing at that ti1ne before this
Honorable Court and had respondent waited during that
time she would have suffered undue delay and hardship.
Under Rule 73 (G) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
the District Court may in its discretion and with or without notice extend the time for filing the record on appeal,
if its order for extension is made before the expiration
of the period for filing as originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order. This time also could be
extended up by three months.
In Peterson v. Ohio Copper, 71 Utah ±±4, 2G6 P. 1050
this Honorable Court stated:
"Whenever the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is involved, as it is by the filing and service
of the Notice of Appeal, the trial Court is shorn
of its jurisdiction, except as to proceedings in aid
of the appeal."
We submit that the order of the trial court for
temporary alimony pending the disposition of the appeal
was in aid of the appeal and to avoid an undue hardship.
This was also true of the matter of the award of counsel
fese for the use and benefit of respondent's attorney in
preparing and presenting her appeal.
As to appelant's statement in his brief that respondent has not demonstrated a need for the relief granted,
that is temporary alimony and attorney's fees on appeal,
we again submit the case of Weiss v. Weiss (supra)
wherein the Court stated that the statute did not contem-
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plute award:-; for PX 1H'nsps of suit or for temporary alitunny slwuld hP made only in those cases where the
"tulvPrsP party'' ( u:-;ually the 'vife) is destitute or practit·nlly so. It contemplatP~ such awards when in the
sound diserPtion of the court the circumstances of the
pnrtit•s an• sueh that in fairness to the wife she should
ht- givl'n financial assistance by her husband in her
prost•eut ion or as in this case her defense of the divorce
udion, and for her support during its pendency.
~\~nin,

in this n1atter, we submit the trial Court
propt·t·ly PXPrcised its discretionary powers and there
has hPen no showing of any abuse.
CONCLUSION
Ht>~pondent

heartily disagrees with appellant's
statement in his brief that the case at bar demonstrates
"the unfortunate attitude of courts to treat divorce cases
in nn off hand 1nanner."
Rt>spondent sub1nits that the trial Court considered
thoroughly the underlying cause of the divorce which is
born out by the record, that appellant, at the outset
and before the marriage, planned to take what pleasures
and conYeniences he might enjoy from respondent and in
return giYe nothing. His penurious, selfish, distrustful
attittHh·. we submit was the sole cause of the marital
troubk. The trial Court was more than fair and liberal
to him. He was not saddled with alimony payments, but
''"a~ required to repay respondent only a relatively
~mall amount for the time, money and energy respondent
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had given him in a futile attempt to make the 1narriage
work. Under the circumstances which he had created
from the beginning we submit Respondent is entitled to
have the Judgment and D·ecree affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
LaMAR DUNCAN
Salt Lake City, Utah
208 Phillips Petroleum Bldg.
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